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Dr. James Tobin is, in my estimation, one of the most creative and
informed of American economists. His literary talents match his pro-
fessional abilities. His experience, including service during 1961-1962
on President Kennedy's Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), entities
him to nationwide attention, which he has justly received.
His National Economic Policy, a volume of eighteen essays written
over a fifteen-year period, covers virtually the entire range of our
national economic problems, including some of their international
aspects. No one concerned with these problems can afford not to read
this book from cover to cover.
Dr. Tobin is a distinctly "liberal" economist and citizen (let each
define "liberal" as he will), and a prime exponent of the "New Eco-
nomics." He holds, and rightly, that the federal budget is but an instru-
ment of the national economy; that neither big federal budgets nor
federal deficits are good or bad per se; that a large and even growing
national debt may be a positive asset if wisely managed; that social con-
siderations do and should enter into national economic policies, and
that political considerations must; and that government should exert
a powerful and even aggressive role in our national life.
But how "new" is all this, even with the extensive additions and
modifications which the book also contains? The widespread claim (not
by Dr. Tobin to any large degree) that it is all new and all good has
been carried too far.1 This excess of enthusiasm, which has character-
ized a good many academic economists both in and out of the public
service, is relatively harmless so long as it is regarded as no more than
n Former Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers; consulting economist and attor-
ney; President, Conference on Economic Progress. A.B. 1928, Columbia University; LL.B.
1931, Harvard University; Dr. Bus. Sc. (hon.) 1965, Bryant.
1. See, e.g., V. Heller, NEw DIsNMsIoNs oF PoLrrmcxL Ecoo3Y (1966).
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a vainglorious boast that "there were no great men before Aga-
memnon." But it is dangerous insofar as it tends to impair objectivity
and receptiveness to badly-needed innovations in national policies. For
these reasons, I shall concentrate mainly not upon what Dr. Tobin
says that is beyond dispute and even highly commendable, but rather
upon what he says that calls for question or even strong dissent.
Economic Growth
Economists have given far too little recognition, either in thought or
in action, to the fact that sustained and optimum economic growth
(defining the optimum as the rate of growth which holds idle plant and
manpower to minimum levels, while encouraging optimum expansion
in plant and in labor force participation) is in reality almost the whole
task of both private and public economic policy. For while we may use
unwisely what we produce, we cannot use what we do not have. In addi-
tion, it is often said that optimum economic growth facilitates the allo-
cation of sufficient resources to the great priorities of our national needs
and social purposes without excessive conflict among groups or insur-
mountable political strain. But this statement, while true, tends to
breed an unsound dichotomy between the problem of economic growth
and these priority purposes. Instead, it is more useful to say that all
allocations of our economic resources, including allocations to these
priority purposes, involve ab initio economic policies; it is not a helpful
distinction (although a common one among economists) to designate
the allocation of resources to factory plant as an economic decision,
and the allocation of resources to the human plant as a social decision.
In any event, viewing the problems of the American economy over the
long run, the allocation of resources which is best in terms of ultimate
human or social values comes very close to the allocation most likely to
sustain optimum economic growth. These conclusions are really im-
plicit in Dr. Tobin's statement that the "overriding issue of political
economy in the 1960's is how to allocate the national output,"-" for no
issue could be the overriding issue if it slighted either the problem of
growth or the problem of the ultimate purposes to which the products
of growth are or should be devoted.
It follows that what Dr. Tobin has to say about pathways to growth
is profoundly important. About half a year before he became a member
of the CEA, he stated that, to stimulate growth, we must "somehow
2. J. TOBIN, NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (July 1960) 78 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
TOBIN]. Dates in parentheses indicate the time at which what Dr. Tobin said was pub-
lished, as this time factor is important in many instances.
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engineer... shifts.., from private consumption to the public sector...
[and] from private consumption to private investment." 3 Taking first
the proposal to effectuate shifts from private consumption to private
investment (which is the part of the proposal honored in the observance
rather than in the breach both during Dr. Tobin's tenure on the
Council and subsequently), I believe that this thesis has been and still is
egregiously erroneous.
In the first place, the thesis rests on two assumptions: that the growth
rate in the civilian labor force is determined predominantly by demo-
graphic factors, and especially that other variations in the long-term
rate of GNP growth are determined by additions to producers' facilities
(quantitative and qualitative), which in turn depend upon private
investment. Consistently with these assumptions, Dr. Tobin and the
Council have frequently insisted that the average ratio of private invest-
ment to GNP was too low for a number of years prior to 1960, and
policies after 1960 were designed to increase this ratio in order to
accelerate the rate of GNP growth.
The trouble with this superficially appealing approach is that it
ignores the importance of the economic environment from year to year
as a determinant of both the rate of growth in the civilian labor force
and the net additions to producers' facilities. Demographic factors may
determine the size of the potential working population, but the state of
the economy significantly influences in both the long and the short run
the percentage of those of working age actually drawn into participa-
tion in the civilian labor force. Similarly, in the long-run as well as in
the short-run, the net additions to producers' facilities depend upon the
economic environment from year to year. Thus, even if in 1970 the
economy is operating in a most favorable economic environment with
full employment and full plant use, producers' facilities in that year
will be very much lower than they would have been if the tremendous
amount of aggregate economic slack between 1953 and 1966 had not
occurred; the same is true of the long-term GNP growth rate, obtained
by comparing the 1970 GNP with that of 1953.
The significance of the foregoing observation is this: in the context
of the actual behavior pattern of the American economy during all
relevant periods since World War I, the dominant factor inhibiting
long-range economic growth has been the failure during many years to
use reasonably fully the productive resources actually available from
year to year. During the periods when such reasonably full resource use
3. TOBIN 80 (July 1960).
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has occurred, the necessary stimuli to adequate participation in the
civilian labor force and adequate net additions to producers' facilities
have been abundantly available. This makes it clear that the problem
of optimum long-range GNP growth is virtually the same as the prob-
lem of avoiding the degree of economic instability which leads to large
disutilization of available resources in particular years.
Avoidance of such disutilization depends upon maintenance of rea-
sonable equilibrium between the rate of expansion of producers' facili-
ties and the rate of expansion of ultimate demand for products in the
form of consumer outlays and public outlays combined. This might
be called the problem of maintaining a sustainable ratio of private
investment to GNP. And for the most part, what is a sustainable ratio
does not turn upon whether we want a higher or lower rate of GNP
growth, but rather upon changes in the productivity of capital. Since
each dollar of investment in producers' facilities in the 1960's tends to
add more to capabilities than a dollar of investment in the 1940's or
1950's (measured in dollars of uniform value), the sustainable ratio of
private investment to GNP has tended to decline. This trend is likely to
be even more pronounced in the future. Accordingly, whenever we
want to promote a higher rate of GNP growth on a sustained basis, the
solution is not to spark an ever higher ratio of investment to GNP, but
rather to encourage the equilibrium expansion of private investment
and other forms of demand. This both Dr. Tobin and the Council have
persistently failed to recognize.
This error in analysis with its unfortunate policy consequences could
have been avoided by empirical observation of the economy's actual
performance between 1953 and 1960. During that period, we experi-
enced a fairly rhythmic pattern of periods of economic upturn at a
reasonably rapid pace, followed by periods of stagnation or unsatisfac-
tory economic growth and then periods of absolute recession. Under-
lying each cycle of this recurring pattern was a rate of expansion of
private investment in producers' facilities so far in excess of the rate of
expansion in ultimate demand (as I have defined it above) that business
investment was cut back very sharply when these imbalances became
sufficiently manifest. These sharp cutbacks, combined with the more
enduring deficiencies in ultimate demand, explain the instability and
the abysmally low rate of economic growth during the period 1953-1960
as a whole. The appropriate policies for the Administration which took
office in 1961, therefore, were measures which would redress these
imbalances by stimulating ultimate demand relatively more than
private investment. But it chose instead various tax reductions and
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concessions during 1962-1965, mainly in 1964, which allocated rela-
tively far too much to the investment function, and relatively far too
little to the stimulation of ultimate demand.
This conclusion as to tax policies would hold even if my analysis of
the appropriate ratio of private investment to GNP were to be disputed.
For to the best of my knowledge, neither Dr. Tobin nor the CEA has
ever claimed that, even without the huge tax bounties granted to the
investment function, investors in 1964 (or since) would have been with-
out ample funds to induce and sustain more than adequate levels of
investment, if the spur of adequate expansion of ultimate demand had
not been lacking. Indeed, for a few years prior to the huge tax bounties
of 1964 the retained earnings of corporations had been in excess of their
actual investment outlays. Dr. Tobin and/or the CEA may have felt
that profit levels after taxes were running too low to induce adequate
investment. But this in itself cannot justify tax bounties of the kind
granted. They would have been justifiable only if per unit profits after
taxes were running too low, and no competent economist would have
made that assertion as to the years in question. On the contrary, per
unit profits after taxes in general were running too high, and this fact
in itself contributed (through the price excesses which this trend re-
flected) to the inadequacy of ultimate demand in real terms. The
proper remedy under such circumstances is not to increase per unit
profits after taxes still further by tax concessions, but rather to use
fiscal policy to expand ultimate demand.
The unfortunate consequences of a misconceived fiscal policy became
very clear in 1966, and even clearer by early 1967. Until the slight
recession in GNP during the first quarter of 1967, the "New Econo-
mists" claimed that we had enjoyed six years of uninterrupted economic
growth. But the growth during 1961-1963 was not in any meaningful
sense a result of national economic policies; it was instead quite similar
to the upturn periods during the Eisenhower Administration, and no
more satisfactory. It was this very fact that prompted the Kennedy
Administration at long last to propose in 1963 the massive tax reduc-
tions which were really the first powerful step directed toward stim-
ulating the economy. To be sure, this action taken in 1964 gave the
economy a big boost for a while. As I have said many times, even this
amount of money thrown into the streets and scrambled for would have
done that. But as I warned before the Senate Finance Committee and
elsewhere in 1964, the mistaken composition of the tax cuts was bound
in time to revive and exacerbate the earlier types of imbalances de-
scribed above. By 1965-1966, the rate of investment in producers'
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facilities was advancing several times as rapidly as ultimate demand.
Then, from first quarter 1966 to first quarter 1967, the GNP growth
rate in real terms fell shockingly and dangerously to only 2.5 per cent,
and was no higher from second quarter 1966 to second quarter 1967.
In third quarter 1967, the growth outlook was far from clear; the pro-
posal for a big tax increase had strong political overtones. I wonder
whether Dr. Tobin is as enthusiastic now as he was in mid-1965 about
the unalloyed wonders of the massive tax cuts. 4
Dr. Tobin implies that we should not worry too much about this
recurrent tendency toward private overinvestment relative to ultimate
demand, since it will not have much effect in the long run on growth in
our ability to produce. "[O]ver the decades," he says, "fluctuations in
the utilization of capacity will have a minor influence [upon growth]
compared to the growth of capacity itself."' This, in my view, is a
demonstrable error. As I said above, fluctuations in the utilization of
capacity, reflected year by year in actual GNP performance, powerfully
affect the rate of growth in capacity over the long run as well as the
short run. Present capacity is tremendously below what it would be if a
trend of adequate economic growth had been maintained since 1953
by avoidance of fluctuations. Even more important, it is palpably wrong
to intimate that, if in 1970 capacity becomes as high as it would have
been without any serious fluctuations from 1953 onward, the full use
of this capacity in 1970 would find us as well off as if there had been
no such fluctuations. Even in that unlikely eventuality, aggregate GNP
for the period 1953-1970 would still have suffered immensely because of
the fluctuations. The benefits of economic growth in the long run, in
terms of rising living standards and other important criteria, depend
vitally upon the aggregate of achievement over the years. Looking only
at the end year in order to measure the growth rate is grossly mis-
leading.,
The Public Sector; Respective Purposes of Spending and Taxation
The other half of Dr. Tobin's 1960 thesis-that we should engineer
shifts from private consumption to the public sector-was also far off
the mark, and still is if reasserted now. I agree entirely, on grounds of
national priorities, that a larger portion of GNP should be allocated
4. See TOBIN 41 (June 1965).
5. TonIN 93 (May 1964).
6. For example, the average annual GNP growth rate during 1953-1966 was 3.5 per
cent which was far too low. In consequence, although in 1966 we were not very far below
reasonably full resource use, the aggregate deficiency in GNP, 1953-1966, was 720 billion
dollars, measured in 1965 dollars.
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to the public sector. But on both economic and social grounds, Dr.
Tobin is wrong in urging to the extent that he does that the resource
cost of achieving this objective should be met by repressing the growth
of private consumption. His prescription here derives from his errone-
ous objective of lifting the long-term ratio of private investment to
GNP.
I believe that this error stems not only from a misappraisal of the
whole problem of maintaining equilibrium at full resource use, but also
from an overweighting of the contribution which increased investment
in public projects can make to the general well-being as against the
need for increased private incomes and consumption. The thirty-odd
million poor do indeed need more and better public facilities and
services, but they need at least equally tremendous increases in their
private incomes. The current war against poverty has over-emphasized
public projects to improve the training, education and attitudes of the
poor, and grossly underemphasized the need for massive public pro-
grams, especially at the federal level, to enlarge their private incomes
through (a) guaranteed full employment for those who are or can be
made employable, and (b) some sort of guaranteed income for others.
It must also be noted that, even while Dr. Tobin was on the Council
of Economic Advisers, it began to develop policy recommendations,
such as those for the massive tax reductions, which have sharply and
progressively rejected his commitment to increasing the ratio of the
public sector to GNP, and indeed have moved dangerously in the
opposite direction. The extent to which Dr. Tobin acquiesced in this
course raises interesting questions as to the responsibilities of a member
of the Council of Economic Advisers. To give Dr. Tobin his due, he
did say a few months after leaving the CEA:
a fiscal stimulus to the economy can be given by tax reduction as
well as by increased expenditure. In fact, I believe that we should
in general set government expenditures at levels consonant with
national priorities in the use of full-employment output, and that
we should then set taxes at levels which induce enough private
spending to employ fully all the resources not purchased by
government.
7
This fine statement that the great national priorities should be
served first is exactly in line with my more extensive formulations of
the same idea on numerous occasions, especially that federal spending
should always be related to output at full employment rather than to
7. ToBm 24 (Nov. 1962).
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actual output. However, it is not entirely in line with Dr. Tobin's fail-
ure to raise a voice against the massive tax cuts of 1964, which ran so
counter to these priority needs. Nor is it consistent with his expressed
enthusiasm for how well the tax cuts have worked, and his approval of
a "temporary prepackaged tax cut" to be used whenever the economy
needs stimulation, despite the ever-growing neglect of the great national
priorities which call for greatly increased federal spending.8 Here
again, I find evidence of the recent tendency of liberal economists to
run with the crowd among their friends in the government, instead of
articulating vigorously and repeatedly their own convictions as to what
the nation really needs.
I find it nothing less than shocking that so few liberal economists
today, and almost none in the academic groves, are undertaking to
educate either the general public or public officials about the enormous
and enduring damage done, not only to our economic performance as
narrowly defined, but also especially to the vindication of our prime
purposes as a nation and a people, by the fiscal policies which the "New
Economics" regards as the very hallmark of its historic achievement.
Even if that policy had been fully successful on the purely economic
front (which, as I have shown, is far from the case), it stimulated the
economy by enlarging the distribution of the things we need least to
have more of, at the expense of the things we need most. We got, for a
while, several million more automobiles per year, when we needed
several hundred thousand more new housing units annually for slum
dwellers. Upon enactment of Medicare, we found that we did not have
enough facilities and personnel to meet the increased demand for
medical services, quite apart from the fact that about 40 per cent of our
population are still unable to afford the modem medical services they
need. The waters and airs remain polluted. The transportation mess
continues. Most of the public schools in our great cities are in shambles.
Higher educational opportunity remains unavailable to hundreds of
thousands each year who have the ambition and the ability but lack the
means. Fundamental resource development continues to be neglected.
Expansion of social insurance has been totally inadequate, and the
nationwide hodge-podge of so-called welfare payments remains con-
fused, conflicting, bankrupt, and degrading.
And the end is not yet. The President's budget for fiscal 1968, as
originally proposed, allocated only about 16 per cent of that budget,
8. TOBIN 41 (June 1965).
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and only about 2.7 per cent of GNP, to the eight programs in that
budget which serve the great priorities of our domestic needs.
I cannot refrain from a word of high praise for my friend J. K. Gal-
braith. In 1958, when the Affluent Society appeared, he was not alone in
stressing the unmet needs in the public sector, although he stated the
case most eloquently. At that time he joined in the chorus of leaders
in all walks of life who, in the aftermath of the first Sputnik in 1957,
began to talk and write about our great national purposes. But Gal-
braith deserves even more credit for the extent to which he has coura-
geously stood almost alone in more recent years. Who else among the
New Frontiersmen since 1961 has challenged the tax reduction orgy,
and continued to proclaim our imperative needs in the public sector?
Some very distinguished economists, even after leaving the govern-
ment have not been content to remain silent about policies incon-
sistent with everything they said and wrote before entering the govern-
ment. Rather, they have actually continued to extol what they would
have condemned if undertaken by a Republican administration."
Dr. Tobin's Precise Policy Views
Further light is shed upon Dr. Tobin's views by what he had to say in
1960 as to the precise measures needed to implement his thesis. He
proposed easier money, and with this I agree. He proposed lightening
the tax burden on corporate investors through a variety of devices,
especially depreciation allowances. He proposed increases in personal
federal income taxes at all levels, with permission to deduct a portion
of savings from taxable income to induce still more saving for private
investment.10 These proposals (aside from the fact that the Council on
which Dr. Tobin served countermarched toward immense tax reduc-
tions on all fronts) were founded upon the thesis that total savings were
inadequate for investment purposes, which was based in turn on the
erroneous assumption that a long-term increase in the ratio of invest-
ment to GNP was needed. The barrier to higher levels of investment,
however, has not been any shortage in savings or other funds available
to corporate investors, but rather their own appraisal of the inadequacy
of ultimate demand for their products.
Cgupled with the proposal for an increase in personal income taxes at
all levels on a relatively non-progressive or even regressive basis, Dr.
9. Of course, Galbraith lampooned the importance of economic growth in The Afflu.
ent Society. But neither liberal nor conservative economists ever took him seriously on
this point.
10. TOBIN 85-87 (July 1960).
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Tobin recommended increases in state and local taxes--property, sales,
and income. Aside from the adverse impact of any such policy upon
total economic performance, this proposal indicates a complete lack of
responsiveness to the terrible distortion, from the point of view of any
relevant social policies, in the incidence of the nationwide tax burden.
Taking into account all forms of taxation at all levels, our national
system of taxation is horribly regressive. The only effective partial
counterbalance to the extremely regressive nature of state and local
taxes has been the federal income tax. But even this tax has been made
much less progressive by the actions taken in recent years. And the
combination favored in 1967 by the Council of Economic Advisers--
the restoration of the 7 per cent tax credit to corporate investors, and
the proposal for a 10 per cent flat increase in taxes across the board-
would accentuate the regressive nature of the entire tax structure,
even with an exemption for families under $5,000.
It is interesting to note that, on the occasion of the celebration of the
twentieth anniversary of the Employment Act, former CEA Chairman
Walter W. Heller admitted that the previous tax reductions had been
relatively unresponsive to the needs of those in the lower portions of
the income structure, and that we should weigh tax reduction heavily
in their favor when tax reduction again became feasible. The President
shortly thereafter voiced the same sentiment in one of his messages to
the Congress. But public policy is now moving in the opposite direc-
tion, and Dr. Heller and other "New Economists" are untypically silent.
Public Policy and Income Distribution
One of my most serious criticisms of Dr. Tobin's book is that it
reflects the progressive neglect of the whole problem of income dis-
tribution which has been characteristic of the general trend in academic
economics for twenty years or longer, and in which most of the nation-
ally-acclaimed liberal economists have shared. There is a strange incon-
sistency between the valid proposition advanced by Dr. Tobin"1 that
resource allocation should be the main concern of the 1960's and the
failure to recognize that it is primarily the distribution of income
which shapes the allocation of resources. In ultimate terms of our
traditions and aspirations, and immediate terms of a genuine dedica-
tion to a war against poverty, we cannot accept with complacency the
fact that about 53 per cent of personal income goes to the highest
income fifth in the United States, and only about 3 per cent to the
11. Tom 78 (July 1960).
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lowest fifth. Nor can any mature economic analysis lead to the con-
clusion that optimum economic growth and full employment can be
restored enduringly without drastic policies directed toward vast im-
provements in income distribution.
Yet Dr. Tobin says that "[r]edistribution of income and wealth by
taxation and government transfer payments was in days gone by another
rallying point for liberal political movements. The fire has gone out
of this one too."'' He offers as a rationalization (though the degree of
his own approbation is at this point somewhat ambiguous) this state-
ment:
The Great Society is not a redistributive program. President
Johnson does not raise the question of distributive justice, as
between rich and poor or capital and labor . .. he proposes to
solve the pressing problems of the Society . out of the vast
annual increment in national product. . . This emphasis is on
an ever-growing pie. .... 13
I have never been derelict in my emphasis upon the cardinal impor-
tance of an "ever-growing pie." But a pie will not bake as it should if
it contains too much sugar and not enough flour, as evolving experi-
ence now so strikingly shows. Of course, Dr. Tobin has not hesitated
to criticize the Goldwater proposal to reduce greatly the progressivity
of federal income taxation.14 But I do not find any similar willingness
to criticize the tax policies of the Administration which Dr. Tobin
served, although these policies-while far better than those espoused
by Goldwater-have swung far away from the progressive principle
and the cause of distributive justice.
Until recent years, economists maintained-perhaps without justi-
fication, and certainly without much proof-that public policies did
not have much influence in the long run upon the relative shares of
income flowing to various groups. But no competent economist would
dare to assert that proposition with respect to the years from 1961
onward. The richer are getting relatively richer, and the poor are get-
ting relatively poorer, although the absolute number living in poverty
has been reduced substantially if still too slowly. Many in between are
being squeezed. Viewing the period 1961-1966 as a whole, there has
been a tremendous shift in favor of profits as against wages, which
explains in large part the recurrent imbalances between investment in
12. ToBm 20 (Nov. 1962).
13. ToBi 42 (June 1965).
14. TOBIN 29 (Oct. 1964).
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the expansion of producers' facilities and expansion of demand for
ultimate products. These wayward results have been reinforced by
almost the entire range of basic national economic policies-the com-
position of the tax reductions; the bias toward tax reduction rather
than toward increased public spending; the Price-Wage Guideposts in
their practical consequences; and the tight money policy and rising
interest rates, which since 1952 have distributed more than 125 billion
dollars in income from those lower down in the income structure who
borrow, to those higher up in the income structure who lend directly
or indirectly.
Assuredly, there has been no time since the 1920's when the powers
of the federal government have been used so abundantly and effectively
to redistribute national income upward. And during the 1920's, Mr.
Mellon's achievements had relatively little impact upon the economy,
because the entire scope of government was so small. While the Federal
Reserve Board made some costly mistakes in those times, it was pri-
marily the imbalances between profits and wages and between invest-
ment and consumption that brought on the Great Crash, for which the
stockmarket debacle served only as the spark.
Nor can I agree with Dr. Tobin's apparent view that increases in
personal income taxes under the progressive federal tax structure would
necessarily tend to reduce aggregate employment and output.1" Entirely
to the contrary, genuinely progressive increases in these taxes, which
we now very much need (not in terms of current or proposed levels of
federal outlay, but rather in terms of needed levels) can add greatly to
our prospects for sustained optimum economic growth and full em-
ployment. This is patently true if the proceeds of these truly progres-
sive tax increases are used to redirect goods and services primarily for
the benefit of the sixty-odd million Americans now living in poverty
or deprivation-benefits which in their very nature will add also to
the safety, comfort, and enjoyments of the entire population, especially
in the cities.
Does Growth in Productivity and Labor Force
Determine Economic Growth, or Vice Versa?
Dr. Tobin also has some very interesting things to say about how
much influence public policy can exert upon economic growth. With
15. TOBIN 128-29 (1956). Cf. 85-87 (July 1960), discussed at p. 1709 supra, advocating such
tax increases as part of a program to accelerate growth.
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some minor modifications, he appears to accept the prevailing view
among economists:
the thrust of much recent theorizing and model building is that
in the really long-run we have no choice [through public policy]
about the growth rate. The long-run growth rates of GNP and
aggregate consumption are exogenously determined by the growtl
of the labor force and the progress of technology [i.e. produc-
tivity].' 6
I cannot too strongly dissent from this position. As earlier indicated,
labor force growth, both short-run and long-run, is powerfully affected
by employment opportunity and economic growth. We have suffered
and are still suffering from a very significant amount of what I have
called concealed unemployment-that is, people who because of
scarcity of job opportunity are not participating in the civilian labor
force, and therefore are not counted as unemployed. Furthermore, our
experience in World War II demonstrates that the degree to which
secondary workers enter the labor force is determined to a considerable
extent by the actual rate of economic growth and actual employment
opportunity. And a veritable host of public policies-social insurance
policy, educational policy, etc.--can greatly affect the rate of growth in
the civilian labor force, though the desirability of using such policies
depends on the relative value placed on more output as against more
leisure, earlier retirement, or other goals. Equally or more important,
growth in productivity is not at all an exogenous factor in the rate of
economic growth. The extent to which available economic resources
are actually being used has a tremendous impact upon productivity,
even apart from the influence of technological change. The failure to
recognize this has been one of the most significant errors of the Council
of Economic Advisers.
For instance, if a plant is operating at 75 per cent of capacity and
retains 85 per cent of its labor force, the division of the 85 into the
75 per cent results in a low productivity fignre. But this acknowledged
inefficiency as a consequence of underutilization does not take into
account the fact that since the productivity potential is continuing to
expand there is a concealed lost productivity here very similar to con-
cealed unemployment. My studies have shown the tendency of gains
in productivity to accelerate over the years under conditions of reason-
ably full resource use, and to drop sharply in economic slowdowns.
The experience of the past few years affords perfect illustration. Failure
16. Tom 99 (May 1964).
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to observe this persistently demonstrated phenomenon explains why
the CEA has consistently underestimated the real rate of economic
growth required to restore and sustain optimum resource use and
optimum growth. It also explains the Council's many aberrations with
respect to the appropriate relationship between changes in real wage
rates and changes in productivity, which should be measured not in
terms of actual productivity gains but in terms of gains in the pro-
ductivity potential. Beyond this, the Council has been singularly unre-
sponsive to the fact that actual gains in real wage rates have lagged
seriously behind actual (not to speak of potential) gains in productivity,
a subject to which I shall revert in discussing Dr. Tobin's views on
inflation.
This failure by the CEA and many other economists to estimate
realistically the full potential of the economy for growth is particularly
damaging at a time when our heavy and rising international commit-
ments, together with the social tensions and other evils resulting from
neglect of the great domestic priorities, should make the very core of
national economic policy the invocation of what I have often called
the great nonsecret weapon of the American economy-its ability to
expand production at a rapid rate. This is the first wartime period,
at least during this century, when we have not clustered all other
economic policies around the core purpose of accelerating economic
expansion. What we did during World War II needs no recital. The
result was that, despite allocation of almost half our output to fighting
that war, we lifted living standards at home, improved income distri-
bution, and brought the opportunity for industrial employment for
the first time to those who had previously been excluded because of
race, sex, and so-called lack of training and education. We did not
listen to those who told us that inflation was a greater danger than
Hitler or Tojo. During the Korean war, we again rejected the advice
of those who urged us, for fear of inflation, to support the war only
through reallocation of the existing product. Instead, we accepted a
temporary increase in inflationary pressures as a small price to pay for
using our great nonsecret weapon to the hilt. That decision yielded
immense benefits, not only during that war, but for many years there-
after.
Yet today the CEA, far from even ruminating about calling forth
this great nonsecret weapon, warmly embraces the prospect of a 4
per cent average annual growth rate in the years immediately ahead
(though even this prospect may not be realized unless there are drastic
changes in policies), and insists that an attempt to reduce the officially
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calculated full-time unemployment rate much below 4 per cent might
be dangerously inflationary. A full-time unemployment rate of close
to 4 per cent means a true level of unemployment of 5/ per cent or
higher, taking account of both the full-time equivalent of part-time
employment and the concealed unemployment. That means a rate of
unemployment among vulnerable groups so many times the nation-
wide average as to be fraught with social and political dangers of
immense significance.
A 4 per cent economic growth rate does not merely fail to recognize
what we could and should do. It fails even to provide for what we
must do to attain the minimal objective of avoiding in the long run
a substantial increase in idle manpower and other productive resources
(concealed, if not overt). With an average annual growth rate in actual
productivity of about 32 per cent or higher during recent years (and a
much higher growth rate in the productivity potential), and with the
labor force, even without special encouragement, likely to grow at
about 1 per cent a year during the years immediately ahead, we need
an annual growth rate of about 5 per cent a year merely to absorb the
increments in productivity and in the civilian labor force after reason-
ably full resource use is restored. For a period of two years beginning
in mid-1967, we need an average annual growth rate of well above 6
per cent to restore reasonably full resource use.
A few figures may help to convey the full significance of this dis-
parity between what we need and what the CEA projects and even
accepts. The difference between a 4 per cent and a 5 per cent real
average annual growth rate in GNP over the next ten years means an
average annual difference in real terms of about 50 billion dollars in
GNP, and the difference between a 4 per cent and a 6 per cent growth
rate means an average annual difference of about 100 billion dollars.
The significance of these differences is indicated by the fact that an
increase of about 11 billion dollars in the aggregate annual incomes
of the more than 30 million poor would lift all of them out of the
poverty cellar, or by the fact that federal outlays in the fiscal 1968
federal budget for the eight great domestic priority programs total only
about 22 billion dollars. Yet we hear loud laments on all sides, with
the CEA among the loudest lamenters, that in terms of our productive
potentials, we "cannot afford" to undertake the essential.
Econometric Models Versus Economic Reality
Let me add one final point on the subject of economic growth. In
my view Dr. Tobin attaches far too much importance to econometric
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growth models. He says: "Thanks to theoretical advance in growth
models . . . we have a better conceptual foundation for these tasks
[economic growth etc.] than we did only a few years ago." 17 For reasons
too technical to state here, some of the leading academic economists
have gone simply wild about their econometric models, and this trend
in itself is corrupting the main body of economic teaching, research,
and honorific recognition, at least if one thinks of economics as a
public-interest tool. Instead of relying so heavily on such models in
the development of policy during Dr. Tobin's tenure and subsequently,
the CEA should have paid much more attention to what had actually
been happening to the economy during previous years, and to con-
structing interrelated and consistent quantitative economic goals for
the future-the real intent of the Employment Act of 1946. If this less
pretentious but far more meaningful approach had been followed, I
believe that some of the policies actually put into effect would have
been unthinkable.
The "Inflation" Scare and the Responsibility of Economists
During the era of the "New Economics," no less than earlier, exag-
gerated if not frenetic concern about the dangers of inflation has de-
flected attention away from more important problems and led to costly
errors in economic policy. This behavior pattern has also been to a
degree hypocritical; while shedding crocodile tears for the damage
inflation does to those unable to protect themselves, some perpetrators
of a number of the so-called anti-inflationary policies have in fact
stuffed the fat and starved the lean.
In the volume under review, there are fleeting instances where Dr.
Tobin indicates his awareness of all this. For example:
Perhaps price stability.., can be justified as a means to achieving
and sustaining high employment, production and consumption.
Too often the means are accorded precedence over the end, and
I am led to take up my pen to defend the basic objective of eco-
nomic policy against its spurious rivals.18
Again:
All good people dislike inflation, just as they oppose rainy week-
ends and traffic accidents. But, like many other evils, inflation is
not an absolute and must be viewed in the perspective of com-
17. TOBIN 107 (May 1964).
18. TOBIN vii-viii (July 1965).
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peting evils. A society can suffer much worse maladies than in-
flation . . .9
And of course, during the Eisenhower years Dr. Tobin had no hesi-
tancy about castigating the Federal Reserve Board for its preoccupation
with misdirected and unsuccessful attempts to stop inflation at the cost
of all else: "No one but Mr. Martin knows how much slack the Federal
Reserve is willing to force upon the economy in the effort to stop
inflation."20 There have also been occasions outside his book when
Dr. Tobin has spoken even more vigorously in this vein. But all these
instances are dwarfed by the fact that the bulk of what Dr. Tobin has
to say here seems to agree with and support the excessive preoccupation
with and mismanagement of the issue of inflation which has continued
unabated even after the advent of the "New Economics." My own belief
that "political economy" is a more fruitful concept than "economics"
does not imply that our best economists, even when outside the gov-
ernment, should remain mute when those of their own political faith
commit and sometimes compound the errors of the opposition.
Reviewer's Position on Subject of Inflation
In order to make myself entirely clear, I need to set forth in some
detail my own position on the subject of inflation before getting back
to Dr. Tobin. In the first place, the United States economy has by all
tests-historical, comparative, and functional-exhibited remarkable
price stability. During the whole period from 1929 to 1966, excluding
the entirely atypical conditions during the World War II era (1939-
1948) and during one year of the Korean War (1950-1951), the average
annual increase in consumer prices was only 0.1 per cent, and in indus-
trial prices only 0.2 per cent, while wholesale prices actually declined at
an average annual rate of 0.3 per cent. Even including the two atypical
periods, the average annual increase in all prices over the past four
decades has been very moderate by any reasonable standard. I shall
discuss subsequently the significance of price trends since 1953.
Second, so-called "inflation" has not been a significant factor in our
unfavorable balance of payments during recent years. Prices in the
United States have been a great deal more stable than in other com-
parable countries. And because international price-trend differentials
affect international trade, it is particularly significant that we have
continued to enjoy a large favorable balance in our international trade
19. TOBIN 65 (March 1958).
20. ToBiN 67 (March 1958).
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accounts. Indeed, this consistent surplus may indicate that we enjoy a
larger share of worldwide markets than can be permanently maintained
or than is consistent with that reasonable degree of equity in worldwide
economic progress which will best serve our own interests in the long
run. Our unfavorable balance of payments has developed in conse-
quence of flows of investment capital from the United States to other
countries, our defense outlays overseas, and our aid to the domestic
economies and defense efforts of other countries. None of these causes
relates significantly to actual price trends in the United States.
Third, and by far most important, there are no ultimate conse-
quences of price trends per se, short of changes so rapid and drastic
that they have no relevance whatsoever to the American scene since
1953. Prices are not an economic end, but rather one of many means
by which resources are allocated in aid of the objectives of economic
growth and its sensible utilization. Within meaningful limits, falling,
stable, or rising general price levels may best promote these objectives.
The truly important issue is the evolving pattern of relative prices and
incomes, which determine the pattern of resource use. If all prices and
incomes were to move upward or downward at the same percentage
rates, nothing much would follow in consequence. The greatest eco-
nomic debacle in the history of the country started after seven years
of remarkable general price stability, except for falling farm prices-
dramatic proof that a stable price level does not in itself prevent accrual
of income maldistribution so severe as to knock the whole economy
for a loop.
In view of the preoccupation of o many economists with "inflation"
in recent years, it is astonishing that one is hard put to find a sober
and comprehensive economic study evaluating, on an empirical basis,
whether a moderately rising price level is more or less conducive to
optimum economic growth and social justice than a stable or moder-
ately falling price level. It is no answer to say that a stable price level
is a good thing, everything else being equal. For everything else is never
equal, and various trade-offs must be made between one objective and
another. Dr. Tobin concedes as much when he says that the "choice is
inevitably and properly a political one. 2 1 Even so, I do not agree with
any implication that the "value" nature of the judgments excuses
economists from, responsibility for so much of the economic nonsense
about "inflation" which has muddied the waters everywhere. As Keynes
said, economists affect all judgments.
21. TOBIN 138 (Jan. 1961).
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Fourth, and in reinforcement of the third point, economists with
rare exceptions have propagated the dogma that the pressures toward
price increases become more serious as the rate of economic growth
accelerates and as we get closer to full employment. I say "dogma"
because none of these economists has put it to a genuinely empirical
test. I have done so in several studies, and have come up with results
which many have ignored but none has attempted to challenge. From
1953 onward, there has been in general an inverse rather than a positive
correlation between the rate of economic growth and proximity to full
employment on the one hand, and price inflation on the other. For
example, during 1955-1958, with the economy confronted first by
almost absolute stagnation and then by an absolute recession, average
annual increases in consumer, wholesale, and industrial prices were
2.5 per cent or higher. But during 1960-1966, with the economic growth
rate in real terms averaging annually about 4.8 per cent, the average
annual increase was only 1.6 per cent for consumer prices, 0.8 per cent
for wholesale prices, and 0.6 per cent for industrial prices.
None of this is paradoxical; it can be readily explained. Just as an
automobile operates less efficiently running at the excessive speed of
90 miles an hour or at the snail's pace of 24 miles an hour than when
running at 50 miles an hour, so the United States economy operates
less efficiently and generates more price inflation when expanding in
real terms either at the World War II "forced" average annual rate of
9 per cent or at the 1953-1960 stagnation rate of 2.4 per cent, than when
running closer to the optimum growth rate of about 5 per cent as it
did during 1960-1966. The analogy is valid even at the slower rates
because most of the upward price movements which have caused con-
cern have been in the so-called administered-price areas, where price
changes represent managerial decisions. In these areas, management
tends to increase prices more rapidly during periods of inadequate
sales than during periods of highly rewarding sales expansion, in an
effort-sometimes successful, sometimes self-defeating-to compensate
for the reduced volume by higher profits per unit of sales.
This thesis finds additional support in the acceleration of price in-
creases in the administered areas during 1965-1967, when the economy
was moving from a fairly high rate of growth toward a stagnation rate,
and when fears of an impending recession were beginning to arise.
The most disturbing increases in the nonadministered sectors of the
-economy during this recent period were in the prices of farm and
-food products and of medical services. The price increases at the
farm level represented a totally inadequate movement toward a more
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equitable share of the national income for farmers, and this was in
short order succeeded by an unusually drastic decline in farm prices.
The increase in the cost of food at the retail level was for a time due
in part to the rising farm prices, but it has also been closely associated
with the problem of administered prices. The increases in the cost of
medical care reflected, among other things, the shocking neglect of
national efforts to develop an adequate and properly distributed med-
ical service. The government's anti-inflationary policies were not at all
directed at the rising cost of medical care. Indeed, far from stemming
the increase, they actually contributed to it in the long run by starving
public outlays for critically needed medical facilities and personnel,
especially in the public sector.
Yet monetary policy since 1952 has persisted, with only minor undu-
lations, in restraining the rate of growth in the money supply, restrict-
ing credit, and pushing interest rates upward-all on the theory that
a reduced rate of economic expansion would help to combat "inflation."
The actual consequences have been to repress needed economic growth,
limit the reduction of unemployment, and aggravate the neglect of the
great domestic priorities (including social justice to the poor). Tighter
credit and rising interest rates have curtailed desirable activities and
hurt the vulnerable; they have done little to check the parts of the
economy which were developing relatively too fast, and they have
actually added to the incomes of those at the top. While the Admin-
istration since 1961, and the economists serving it inside and outside
the government, have sometimes muttered their disapproval of Fed-
eral Reserve policies, the Reports of the CEA during this period have
in the main defended these policies and have at no time issued any
substantial challenge to them. Nor has Dr. Tobin-since 1961.
Prior to 1967, the "New Economics" had not made substantial use
of fiscal policy to fight "inflation." But the January 1967 Report of
the Council of Economic Advisers, in supporting the proposal for a 6
per cent across-the-board tax increase (as distinguished from progressive
tax increases coupled with needed increases in domestic public spend-
ing), demonstrated the complete adherence of the "New Economics"
to the dogma of a necessary positive correlation between (a) the rate
of economic growth and proximity to full employment and (b) the
danger of price increases. And quite apart from the price issue, early
1967 was a preposterous time for the CEA to be seeking to repress the
actual economic growth rate, or to be espousing an economic growth
rate of only 4 per cent and a full-time unemployment rate of close to 4
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per cent. The shift to espousal of a 10 per cent across-the-board tax
increase later in 1967 doubled the error in spades.
But some "New Economists" of very high repute, such as Dr. Heller,
have argued that the proposed tax increase was proper on "moral"
grounds in order to convince the American people of the seriousness
of the international situation, and on "political" grounds in view of
the prospective size of the federal deficit. I can see nothing particularly
moral about persuading the American people to adopt a policy which
would sacrifice a part of the economic performance that we need on
the altar of fiscal self-flagellation. Why not a day of fasting each week
to make us aware of the international situation, although we have an
abundant food supply? The political argument for a tax increase merely
to reduce the prospective size of the federal deficit (which may not in
actuality be reduced because the tax increase is the wrong medicine
even for that) represents a complete about-face on the part of the
"New Economics," which previously had claimed that it had both
learned and taught to others the lesson that the federal budget should
be shaped in terms of the needs of the national economy.
Still another reason advanced for the proposal to increase taxes in
order to fight "inflation" in the face of a stagnant economy is that even
a stagnant economy may be endangered by "cost-push" or "income"
inflation, resulting from excessive wage settlements which lead to price
increases. Before getting into Dr. Tobin's views on this subject, refer-
ence should be made to his statement that neither fiscal policy nor
monetary policy is an "effective antidote" to "income" inflation.2 For
irrespective of the validity of that view, the really important point to
be made is not that neither of these two policies is an "effective anti-
dote" to "income" inflation in consequence of excessive wage settle-
ments; it is rather that excessive wage settlements are an imaginary
danger which has haunted Dr. Tobin and the "New Economics" since
1961. The result has been an obsessive concern with preventing ex-
cessive wage increases which has contributed further to the regressive
tendencies in national economic policy.2
The Price-Wage Guideposts
Indeed, the best evidence of the misdirected thinking of the "New
Economics" with respect to the "income" inflation problem has been
the Price-Wage Guideposts. For quite apart from the actual economic
22. TOBIN 124 (Aug. 1951).
23. For evidence of Dr. Tobin's own concern about this alleged cause of inflation, see
TOBmI 119 (1966), 124 (Aug. 1951) and, more generally, 128-33 (1956).
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realities with which they had to deal, these Guideposts committed the
elementary error of looking upon wages only as a business cost, and
not also as a factor in consumer incomes. They sought to prevent wage
increases which might impose excessive costs upon business and thus
lead to price increases, but they evidenced no concern about the in-
adequacy of wage increases from the viewpoint of balanced expansion
of consumer income. Regardless of which of the two problems has in
fact been the more important, the failure to look at both resulted in
attempts to influence wage trends without any comparable effort to
influence price trends, and without the establishment of any standard
whatsoever for appropriate levels of profits. Those attempts, which
ignored both the vital relationships between wages and profits and the
fact that prices are mainly a factor in determining the relative trends
in real profits and real wages as they bear upon the balance between
consumption and investment, exhibited an almost inexplicably naive
concept of the whole economic problem.
Further, this one-sided perspective was totally unresponsive to the
realities of the economic situation either before or after 1961. For the
core problem, as has been shown, was the constant or at least highly
repetitive tendency of profits and investment to be far too high in
proportion to the ultimate demand in which wages are so important
a factor.
The details of the Guideposts with respect to wages not only mis-
interpreted the problem; they actually aggravated it by using the
nationwide average gain in productivity as a ceiling but not a floor.
They attempted to hold down to the level of the average nationwide
productivity gain the wage increases in the industries whose produc-
tivity gains were higher than that average, but did nothing to bring up
to that average the wage settlements in industries whose productivity
gains were below the average. This curiously inconsistent policy as-
sured that the nationwide average of wage-rate gains would lag far
behind average productivity gains. It thus in effect assured the defeat
of the very principle on which the Guideposts allegedly rested: that
nationwide wage-rate gains should be kept roughly in line with
nationwide productivity gains. That this imbalance has in fact been a
salient feature of economic development during 1961-1966 as a whole
has belatedly become so commonly recognized that it would be super-
fluous to document it with many facts. Suffice it to say that, during
1961-1966, output per man-hour in the total private non-farm economy
increased at an average annual rate of 3.1 per cent, while the compar-
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able rate of increase in real wage rates per man-hour was only 2.7 per
cent.
On social and equitable grounds, there would be much to be said
for a policy which held wage-rate gains in the highest productivity
industries below the nationwide average of productivity gains, if it
were accompanied by two other sets of policies: (1) policies which put
some real pressure upon the high-productivity industries to reduce
their prices, and which imposed enough taxes upon them to prevent
exorbitant profits, which are both an incitement to labor and a spur
to excessive investment, and (2) policies which deliberately used the
resources of the government to supplement the incomes of lowly-paid
workers in low-productivity industries so that their incomes might at
least keep pace with the nationwide average of productivity gains. But
neither of these two sets of policies has been even faintly attempted.
Instead, the high-productivity high-profit industries have been plied
with all sorts of additional tax bounties and concessions, even while
the Council of Economic Advisers has rejected as "inflationary" an
increase in the minimum wage sufficient to enable the poorly-paid
workers to make progress at a rate only somewhat below that of the
nationwide productivity gains.
Although the volume under review has little if anything to say about
the Guideposts, I have found no evidence in other sources that Dr.
Tobin has questioned them, except possibly on grounds of efficacy.
He has certainly joined in the mistaken economic analysis they reflect.
Dr. Tobin's Proposals for Dealing with Inflationary Threats
Dr. Tobin's own suggestions for dealing with the "income" inflation
threat, which he appears to deem as real a problem as does the CEA,
do not include direct price-wage controls. I agree completely, short of
a much more acute defense emergency in economic terms than we are
now experiencing. Moreover, to give the government power to fix prices
and wages would do more harm than good if the underlying economic
analysis remains the same as that exemplified by the "New Economics"
in recent years.
In the fight against "inflation," Dr. Tobin does favor aggressive and
aggregative monetary controls. 24 I cannot entirely reconcile this posi-
tion with his belief that monetary controls are ineffective in dealing
with "income" inflation, in view of the clear evidence in the volume
under review when read as a whole that this is the kind of inflation
24. TOBIN 118 (1966).
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which he most fears. More important, I have frequently challenged the
efficacy of aggregative fiscal or monetary attempts to stimulate or re-
strain the economy in the absence of more refined analysis as to which
parts of the economy need to be stimulated and which parts restrained.
Toward a More Mature National Economic Policy
The shortcomings of the "New Economics" really boil down to this:
It has tended toward copybook-maxim application of general theories,
without constructing a satisfactory picture of the economy in operation
and the goals to be sought. These defects arise, in the final analysis,
from failure to observe the real mandate of the Employment Act of
1946.
What, then, ought to be done for the future? First of all, a careful
quantification should be made of the operation of the economy in the
recent past, on both the product and income sides. The figures thus
obtained should then be analyzed to determine what imbalances con-
tributed to the unsatisfactory economic performance, and the alter-
native policies which would have worked better. Benefiting by this
resort to experience, the CEA should construct a long-range and equally
detailed quantification of goals for the future, taking into account the
inseparable objectives of optimum economic growth and attention to
the priorities of our national needs. It should then construct and co-
ordinate a complete and comprehensive set of national economic pol-
icies for attaining these goals, including as a minimum fiscal policy,
monetary policy, social security policy, housing policy, farm policy,
and some of the regulatory policies.
If the powerhouse of national public policies were thus put in order,
I believe that government economic programs would work fairly well
without much public tampering with managerial price decisions or
collective bargaining. And because I think first things should be put
first, I would like to see the government make additional attempts to
sharpen its own tools through improved analysis. After all, if the Price-
Wage Guideposts had been accepted in full instead of being ultimately
rejected, the economic results would have been even worse than they
were, because the economics of the Guideposts was so meretricious.
Nonetheless, a reconstruction of public economic policies would leave
room for potentially useful further efforts to develop guidelines for
voluntary price and wage adjustments, derived from the same inter-
related goals as those prescribed above for public economic policies.
But there must be institutional devices quite different from the late
Guideposts. The new guidelines should be entirely voluntary, because
1724
Vol. 76: 1701, 1967
Book Reviews
it does not promote a viable or healthy relationship between govern-
ment and private enterprise for the government to decide on an
ambiguous and ad hoc basis whether a publicly declared policy is to
be pressed as quasi-law or entirely ignored. In public administration,
there is room both for the voluntary and the imperative; there is not
much room for a nebulous hybrid of the two.
More important, the voluntary guidelines I suggest as an integral
part of the economic analysis entering into the work of the CEA and
the Economic Reports should allow consultation with functioning
economic groups at the formulation stage, sufficient to give them a
sense of participation and enlarge their understanding. This purpose
is not served by so-called Labor-Management Conferences conducted
under the aegis of the White House, which merely provide each side
another chance to tell the other how wrong it is, and result at most
in rather sterile joint pronouncements which avoid the real issues.
Labor-Management Conferences might provide one instrumentality
for what I have set forth above, provided that the CEA took the lead-
ership in providing these conferences with long-range perspectives
developed in concrete form. But to do this, the CEA must change its
entire concept of its own functions. For it would be silly to think that
the CEA could bring to those outside the government what it has not
yet brought even to those inside.
Even a casual glance at the Reports of the President and the Reports
of the CEA under the Employment Act would reveal that nothing
approximating what I have often suggested has yet been attempted.
Measured against these requirements for effective planning under free-
dom, which are imposed by our own domestic situation and by the
worldwide competition confronting us, the "New Economics" is not
new enough. In truth, it is new only when measured against the
economics of the 1920's and early 1930's.
Gold and the Balance of Payments
Dr. Tobin's discussion of the international monetary system leaves
almost nothing for me to criticize in what he states affirmatively, and
much for me to applaud. The discussion is expert, thoughtful, and
highly suggestive. It makes constructive suggestions for improvements
in the international monetary system, and with these I am generally
in agreement. The subject, however, is perhaps too technical for fur-
ther discussion here.
But I am considerably discouraged that Dr. Tobin has not said a
good many things that need to be said, and said particularly by those
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in his position. He does say-three years after leaving the CEA-in
discussing the dollar crisis and related matters:
[I]f the financial ship has weathered it, it has done so only by
jettisoning much of the valuable cargo it was supposed to deliver.
Currency parities have been maintained, but full employment has
not been. The economic growth of half the advanced non-
Communist world has been hobbled .... 2
However, just about the time he was appointed to the CEA, he made
the following statement in a quite different vein, which was a sad omen
of things to come: "To achieve it [a solution to the dollar crisis through
international monetary agreements and mechanisms] is the first eco-
nomic task of the new [Kennedy] Administration. Otherwise we shall
not be free ... to embark on new domestic programs."2' 0
This prophecy was not entirely accurate, because of course some new
domestic programs were embarked upon, even though the needed inter-
national solution was persistently avoided. But the emphasis upon
achieving this solution as the top priority served as a warning that the
"New Economics" was prepared to exaggerate the impact of the balance
of payments problem quite as irrationally as it was prepared to exag-
gerate the "inflation" threat, and thus to impale us upon a new cross
of gold.
In fact, while the balance of payments problem has still not been
effectively attacked, the "New Economists" did use it to justify policies
which hobbled and distorted the domestic economy. One of the main
arguments repeatedly advanced in support of the new fiscal policies
was that, regardless of domestic needs, this extraordinary stimulus to
investment in producers' facilities was essential to improve our com-
petitive position in international trade and thereby help our balance
of payments problem. As I have already indicated, the balance of pay-
ments problem is not attributable to any weakness in our trading posi-
tion, and excessive emphasis upon its importance has served rather to
engineer dangerous cutbacks in our economic aid to the underdevel-
oped countries.
I believe that the message which should have been impressed upon
the people and reflected in public policy is something along these lines:
In our own self-interest, and in support of some essential aspects of
our avowed international policies, the flow of American capital to
underdeveloped nations should expand so rapidly as to result in a
25. TOBIN 153 (May 1964).
26. ToBIN 143 (Jan. 1961).
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fairly consistent and large increase in our unfavorable balance of pay-
ments for as far into the future as we can see. It is impossible for all
nations to improve their balance of payments situation at the same
time. Practically all of the underdeveloped countries, and many of
those which are highly developed urgently need to avoid a so-called
worsening of their balance of payments situation. We do not. We are
verily a great domestic empire, and far less dependent than others upon
the state of our international payments account. I predict that, within
a decade or so, preoccupation with this problem will seem as anachron-
istic as the views of those who today are still as fearful of federal deficit
spending as most people were a generation ago.
In any event, the parable of the tail swinging the elephant does not
approach in absurdity the spectacle of our attempts-unsuccessful at
that-to improve our balance of payments position by a few billion
dollars at most, at the cost of scores of billions of dollars annually in
our national product. The real problem is to cut as rapidly as we can
the connection between the balance of payments problem and its settle-
ment in terms of gold. The degree of our commitment to this yellow
metal is both slavish and superstitious. It is also hopeless. Since the
gold supply of the world is increasing at only about one per cent a year,
while the monetary systems underlying both domestic economies and
international exchange must expand sufficiently to support funda-
mental economic expansion at annual rates of 5 per cent and much
higher (depending upon the country), any substantial connection be-
tween gold and monetary systems becomes progressively crippling.
Moreover, if we could corner all the gold in the world, it would still
do us no good in the long run, because other countries would take steps
to avoid being ruined by our monopoly. We would do likewise if others
held more gold than would permit us to honor the gold myth.
I cannot help but believe that Dr. Tobin really feels the same way.
I wish that he would say so, loud and clear. He should have said so,
loud and dear, even when he was on the Council of Economic Advisers,
and when it became so unmistakably plain that we are on the gold track
instead of the right track.
The Role of the CEA
Dr. Tobin's discussion of "academic economics in Washington" is
disappointing. It does not really concentrate upon what the academi-
cians in Washington should do, especially when on the CEA, but in-
stead attempts to argue how fortunate it is for everybody that (since
1953 at least) the members of the Council of Economic Advisers have
been recruited entirely from the academic groves.
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It is really not the fact that academic economics, in its recent or
current manifestations, is a uniquely desirable form of training for
policy advisers in the top ranks of public service. To recruit the mem-
bers of the CEA entirely from this one source is comparable to choosing
the Secretary of State by a poll of the teachers of international affairs
at our leading universities, or to recruiting members of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff solely from among teachers at our military academies. Even in
economics, there is merit in Clemenceau's aphorism that war is too
important to be left entirely to the generals.
The academic monopoly is even less desirable when, as has happened
in fact if not in form, all members of the Council of Economic Advisers
since 1953 (except the first Chairman under Eisenhower and the first
Chairman under Kennedy, who could not be so selected) have been
chosen by their friends and admirers who got to the CEA before them,
rather than by the President of the United States. This kind of pro-
gressive inbreeding is, on many scores, not ideal. One specific conse-
quence has been a partial stifling of objective evaluation of the CEA
by former CEA members and their guild.
I agree only to a limited extent with Dr. Tobin's statement that
resignation is the ultimate protection against the danger that the
Economic Advisers may be used to justify and embellish policy deci-
sions which they have had no part in making.2 7 Some such resignations
have indeed been in order, and there have been too few of them. But
the much larger difficulty is that the Economic Advisers have partici-
pated too much in the making of decisions contrary to their own be-
liefs, and contrary to what they should have been advising.
It has by now become axiomatic among the "New Economists" that
there was no other "political" choice than the policies which I have
criticized. To this there are three answers. The first is that, while a
President must make the ultimate decisions which are in a sense polit-
ical in nature, he cannot develop a satisfactory calculus among com-
peting considerations unless the economists refrain from shaping their
advice too much to what they consider the political factors to be,
instead of steadfastly laying on the line what they really think needs
to be done. The tendency to follow the former course is perhaps
accentuated when the Council of Economic Advisers is composed
entirely of academic economists, who are prone to think that they must
lean over backwards when they enter "practical" affairs.
27. ToBiN 204 (1963).
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The second answer is that, based upon my own considerable experi-
ence, I feel that some of the decisions made by Presidents in recent
years would have been quite different if the Economic Advisers had
advised them differently. Presidents are not economics experts and, in
large matters, they tend generally to do what they think is best for the
country, and to rely considerably upon what their experts say.
And the third answer is that there is a wide gap between what it is
easiest to do politically and what it is feasible to do politically with
sufficient effort and perhaps a willingness to accept a considerable
amount of conflict. Progress in a democracy often necessitates consider-
able conflict. One of the great problems of our times is to make sure
that the ceiling of so-called political feasibility is not so far below the
floor of what we may need to do to survive and prosper that we run
into avoidable disasters.
While Dr. Tobin's volume deals with specific issues of economic
policy, Dr. Heilbroner's is much more generalized. To use the term he
originated for one of his earlier books, he writes as a "worldly philoso-
pher." Yet there is a much closer connection between the two books
than might appear at first glance. With rare exceptions, the basic
analysis of the "New Economics" is the inarticulate major premise of
Dr. Heilbroner's book. In the main, therefore, it would be repetitive
for me to direct against Dr. Heilbroner some of the criticisms I have
aimed at Dr. Tobin. It may be fair to make the point, however, that
some of the excessive optimism about the future which I think may be
charged against Dr. Heilbroner may be due in part to his assumption
that the "New Economics" has carried us further along the road of
progress than it actually has.
Entirely apart from what I have just said, I am rather disappointed
in this new book by Dr. Heilbroner. "Popular" books serve a unique
and essential purpose. But in my view, the medium of expression does
not relieve the author of responsibility to delve a bit more deeply into
those problems which he himself chooses to identify but skims over too
lightly. In this connection, my disappointment arises not from any in-
clination on my part to tell any author what he should put in his book,
but rather from my awareness of what Dr. Heilbroner can put into a
book. Some of his earlier volumes, such as The Worldly Philosophers
and A Primer on Government Spending (with Peter L. Bernstein), were
splendid contributions to the popularization of economic knowledge
and the enlargement of economic understanding. I do not use the word
"popular" in any deprecatory sense. Dr. Heilbroner has frequently-in
fact generally-stood on firmer ground, reached better judgments, and
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displayed a more elevated sense of values and priorities, than many
other economic writers who have hidden their essential vulnerability
in a cloud of technicalities and pretenses. The new book does not
satisfy me because it is not Dr. Heilbroner at even near his best. And
I feel that this is a waste, because we all need many more books from
him that are akin to his best.
The first of two long essays in the new book purports to deal with
capitalism in America as it is. Facts are presented 28 which demonstrate
that giant corporations control an immense portion of the United States
economy, but that the trend toward concentration has been slowing
down. This demonstration is correct. But I think Dr. Heilbroner makes
too much of this point. An increase in the speed of an automobile from
10 to 70 miles an hour exceeds by this test a further increase from 70
miles an hour to 110, but the latter development may pose much more
serious problems than the former. Besides, the really interesting and
important issues are the business practices which this giantism en-
genders, and the institutional problem of how big business and big
government may reinforce or c6unterbalance one another in the actual
implementation of economic policies.
The author then turns his attention to a discussion of the attitudes
and outlooks of big businessmen, and to an appraisal of trends in their
influence upon the economy and economic policy at large.2 9 Ie cites
some interesting statistics indicating that the overlapping of ownership
and management is relatively slight; that management is not drawn
predominantly from any one class; and that the extremely wealthy men
who hold large blocks of shares in particular corporations probably
exert a good deal of pressure with respect to the original selection of
top management, but not much with respect to managerial decisions
thereafter.
Then he presents a series of lectures by businessmen to show that,
taking their own phraseology at its face value, they are becoming in-
creasingly aware of the larger world and of their social responsibilities.
He indicates a healthy sense of skepticism as to whether these assertions
are much more than an attempt at good public relations. But I think it
would have been much more helpful to explore what big businessmen
have to say on specific issues of economic policy, both private and
28. R. HEILBRONFR, THE LImiTs OF AIfMUCAN CAPITALISM 3-23 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as HEILBRONER].
29. H IBRONER 23-65.
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public. The evidence that they had so little to say on those issues in the
series of lectures cited is in itself revealing.
Discussing trends in the effective power of giant businesses, Dr. Heil-
broner reaches the conclusion that they no longer overpower labor.
This is undoubtedly true. But comparisons of the current situation with
the former helplessness and exploitation of labor tend to support the
currently common view that true equality has been attained. It may
even imply to many readers (although it is not stated) that the pendu-
lum has swung decisively in labor's favor.
The truth is not to be found in such generalities. A closer approxima-
tion to the truth may be obtained primarily by examining the signifi-
cance of the portion of the work force which is still unorganized, and
equally by evaluating relative trends in profits and wages during recent
years and their impact upon our entire economic performance. My
examination of these questions in reviewing Dr. Tobin's work makes
my own position clear. And again I feel bound to state my regret that
economists as liberal, perceptive, and influential as Doctors Heilbroner
and Tobin are not directing more public attention to this point.
Dr. Heilbroner also concludes that giant business is coming to exer-
cise far less power over small business, and attributes the decline of
small business to the market place rather than to big business. I do not
believe that this conclusion is really supported by comparing the preda-
tory policies of the first Rockefeller with the policies of today's tycoons.
It would take much more evidence and analysis than Dr. Heilbroner
has brought forth to convince me that there is not much causal connec-
tion between the practices of the giants and the demise of small busi-
ness. It might be useful, in this connection, to take a look at the way
giant industry typically treats its small business suppliers of components.
In any case, cause and effect analysis is always tricky, and I would find
more significant an evaluation of the economic and social significance
of the continuing growth of the giants, albeit at a slower pace, and of
the continuing decline of small business. (I do not mean by this to take
a position for or against either of these trends.)
The author concludes that the power of giant business over the con-
sumer is excessive, and cites as evidence the fact that prices are still too
high. My first comment would be this: Insofar as the statement that
prices are too high means that resources are being misallocated, and
insofar as the allocation would be quite different if the relative power
of big business and labor were different, I cannot entirely square Dr.
Heilbroner's conclusion regarding the business-labor relationship with
his conclusion regarding the business-consumer relationship. Besides,
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all workers are consumers, and collective bargaining is directed toward
improving their living standards as consumers.
More important still, Dr. Heilbroner suggests that the only effective
weapon against redressing the corporate-consumer relationship is im-
proved competition. But he does not tell us how this could or should be
brought about, and he ignores the core problem of the role of public
policies in influencing pricing practices. Quite aside from controls and
voluntary guidelines, fiscal policy has a very important effect on pricing.
Industries can hardly be expected to show price restraint when they are
given enormous tax concessions based upon their assertion that they
need more profits after taxes. Conversely, higher taxes can be used to
reduce the marginal value of price increases.
The essay on capitalism concludes with an argument that the power
of big business over legislation is waning, and that the true power of
the military-industrial complex resides in government, not business. I
submit that proof of this thesis would require much more subtle and
penetrating analysis than is offered. The author seems to rest his case
on the relative decline in the number of big businessmen in the public
service vis-h-vis scientists and other academicians. I take a dim view of
the idea that businessmen in the public service are the principal source
of big business influence on public policy; they, like academics, may
tend to lean over backwards to make themselves politically respectable.
The real source lies rather in the extent to which contacts with and
reliance upon private business advice determine public economic
policies.
And one may also wonder how much the increasing subsidization of
the universities by big business and the part-time private consultation
activities of university professors affect the actions if not the thoughts of
those who are assumed to be entirely objective. I do not find as much
solace as Dr. Heilbroner does in the immense contribution which big
business is pouring into the educational stream. It has always struck me
as ironic that so many are concerned lest federal aid to education influ-
ence the teaching process, and so few about the contributions to educa-
tion by private foundations whose management and control are not
quite so divorced from the business community as many suppose.
The second portion of Dr. Heilbroner's book"' deals with "the limits
of American capitalism." The main discussion begins with a five-page
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they enjoy privileges. This seems to me an outstanding example of
taking too long to say too little. It could all be put into one sentence-
that capitalists resist change because they are doing so well without
change.
It is then argued that capitalism does not bear much responsibility
for the amount of American poverty, because by and large the poor
are not industrial workers, and because the distibution of the 70 billion
dollars of annual corporate profits (as of the mid-1960's) among the
whole work force would lift the living standards of the poorest very
greatly, but would not have much relative effect upon the living stan-
dards of others.32 This latter argument is not very much to the point,
because there is no serious proposal under discussion to reallocate in-
come to the entire work force, including workers earning $12,000 a
year. It has been competently estimated that an increase of about 11
billion dollars in the annual incomes of the poor would lift all of them
out of the poverty cellar. Moreover, as I have shown elsewhere, 60 per
cent of all of the poverty in the United States is due to full-time or part-
time unemployment and to substandard wages of those employed.
Thus, with a genuine full-employment policy, those who cannot be em-
ployed could be lifted out of the poverty cellar at a cost of about 6
billion dollars a year.
Dr. Heilbroner himself accepts the 11-billion-dollar-a-year figure
which I have cited. s In the discussion which follows,34 he expresses the
view that the opposition of the capitalist elite to a redistributional
program of even this modest size, and the high cost of defense, will
probably delay the extirpation of poverty for another three or four
decades. I think that this forecast is far too dismal, and that poverty
could be virtually eliminated within ten years by utilizing a very tiny
fraction of what I have called the "economic growth dividend," and
indeed without increasing the ratio of the federal budget to GNP.=
One of the most interesting and useful parts of Dr. Heilbroner's book
is the table30 which shows how regressive actual tax rates are, when
compared with the scheduled rates. Since the trend in federal taxation
is toward increasing regressivity, I feel that much more emphasis should
be placed upon the vital importance of making the federal income tax
structure more progressive. I think that Dr. Heilbroner grossly under-
32. HEiL RoNER 76-80.
33. IHaEMBRONR 81.
34. HEILBRONER 80-84.
35. See A 'Tn _obi BUnDGr" FOR ALL A?,mucNs (1966), published by the A. Philip
Randolph Institute, of which I was the principal author.
36. HI- RoNER 86.
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states the economic importance of improved income distribution when
he says:
The maldistribution of income and the social problems that spring
from it can no longer be said to constitute an issue that threatens
the viability-although it may seriously jeopardize the social peace
-of capitalism.
37
I have earlier stated my conclusion that greatly improved income dis-
tribution is essential even to sustained optimum economic growth and
the avoidance of considerable cyclical disturbances.
Dr. Heilbroner proceeds to an interesting and useful discussion of
remedies for cyclical instability, which he does regard as a genuine
threat to capitalism, even though he does not recognize fully the con-
nection between this instability and income maldistribution. He is
moderately optimistic that the maintenance of aggregate demand
through modern fiscal policy can deal substantially with this problem,
and he says that the real question is whether we will go beyond the
issue of stabilization to the issue of allocating a sufficient portion of our
burgeoning resources to the social well-being. For reasons which I have
stated earlier, I believe that this allocation and the solution of the
economic problem when more narrowly defined are really one and the
same thing. Dr. Heilbroner is not too optimistic about the prospects
for improved treatment of the allocation problem through more em-
phasis upon planning, though he sees the need for greater efforts in this
direction. But his discussion of this question trails off rather inconclu-
sively; it would have been preferable, in my view, to specify and evalu-
ate some of the types of limited planning which do not seem to me
unattainable, even within the context of Dr. Heilbroner's basic assump-
tions.38
The final pages strike the optimistic note that economic growth,
rising general standards of living, increased stress upon the types of
work which are valuable for their own sakes rather than their material
yield, and, above all, the progress of science and its application to tech-
nology, will enable us by evolution rather than by revolution to make
the decades ahead better than those which have passed." Fundamen.
tally, I share this optimism. But I am not sure how much good it does to
state it without saying much more, for it may easily foster the illusion
of the inevitability of progress. I feel that our current problems on the
37. HEILIPOR 88.
38. See A "FR Enom BuDrET," supra note 35.
39. HLBRONER 110-34.
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domestic scene, not to speak of overseas, should generate a sense of
urgency and programmatic particularity far beyond what this book has
to offer. And so I close with what I said at the start-that Dr. Heil-
broner has been entitled to choose his own content, but that I fervently
hope that this gifted and morally-aware author will turn in his next
work to a more insistent call to action. 0
Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries. By
Harry G. Johnson. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings In-
stitution, 1967. Pp. 279. $6.75.
The purpose of this book, as stated by its author, is twofold: first, to
survey the major issues raised by the United Nations Conference for
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for United States policy toward
the less developed countries; second, to explore the various alternatives
for American trade and development assistance policy for the benefit of
government officials, academic experts, and concerned members of the
public.' Its scope is therefore quite broad. It deals with all the major
external economic factors affecting development: foreign aid; com-
modity agreements; compensatory financing for shortfalls in exchange
earnings from exports of primary commodities, both mineral and agri-
cultural; tariff preferences for the manufactured and semi-manufac-
tured products of less developed countries; protectionism in developed
countries; and international monetary reform. Detailed consideration
is also given to a number of internal aspects of development.
At a time when the obstacles to economic development of the under-
developed countries are "innumerable and elusive,"2 it is not surpris-
ing that all kinds of prescriptions for improvement should be advanced.
Nor is it astonishing that less developed countries and their spokes-
40. Some of my own works, which elaborate my views as expressed in this review, are
THE ROLE OF WAGES IN A GREAT SocIETY (1966), PnocmEss OR PovTnnm: Tm U.S. AT TILE
CROssRoADs (1964), THE TOLL OF RISING INTEREsr RATms (1964). TAxEs AND "rE PUt3c
INERST (1963), Two Top PmORrvT PROGn"Is To REDIcE U t.pLOY.itwar (1963), KEY
PoLicrms FOR FULL ErpLOyim.T (1962), INrLATrox-CUsE & Cure (1959), and Tim Fm-
ERAL BUDGE' AND =sm GENERAL WELFARE (1959), all published by the Conference on Eco-
nomic Progress, 1001 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. A "FREEDoM Mrrol-"
:FOR ALL A? mucAss is obtainable at the same address. See in addition my testimony and
statements as carried in the Hearings of the Congressional Joint Economic Committee
during most years since 1949, including 1967.
1. H. JOHNSON, ECONOMI,1C PoLICrs TowAw Lxss DE-LOPED CouNTrIEs 241 (1957).
2. Kemorty, Argentina: The Politics of Late Industrialization, 45 FoREcN AFFAms
426 (1967).
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men should be abstemious in advocating those measures which require
domestic self-help in the form of often painful economic and social
changes of a deep-seated nature, and most energetic in calling for ex-
ternal assistance. UNCTAD, which in effect represents the less de-
veloped countries, has been vociferous about the need for external
assistance, particularly in the form of trade measures, but barely
vocal about self-help; even while recognizing its importance3 Raul
Prebisch, as head of UNCTAD, has felt constrained to understate the
need for internal reform.
Early in his book, however, Johnson puts economic development in
its proper perspective. The development problem is one of converting
a "traditional" society, based largely on subsistence or near-subsistence
agriculture and on the export of a few primary commodities, into a
"modern" society.4 Economic development requires the transformation
of both a society and its economy. A pastoral, caste-ridden, oligarchically.
organized society cannot be industrialized; industrialization requires
not only a rational approach to the production process-i.e., organiz-
ing production in business enterprises characterized by specialization
and division of labor-but also a skilled labor force, competent pro-
fessional managers, and a competitive environment to assure the effi-
cient allocation of resources. Radical changes are often needed in land
tenure systems as well, and the distribution of income must be shaped
to create a middle class motivated to improve by work and education
its own and its children's economic condition.
Having identified the primacy of internal reform as the sine qua non
for economic development, Johnson did not regard it as part of his
task to consider how such reforms might be brought about. This task
of political and economic analysis of the means of achieving the ob-
jective, although clearly acknowledged to be as important as an appreci-
ation of the proper goals, was left to others. His undertaking, large
enough in itself, was limited to a consideration of the best methods of
extending external assistance to development.
In general, Johnson advocates those measures of external assistance
which maximize the allocation of resources according to comparative
advantages in the production and distribution of goods and services:
free trade and the dismantling of protectionist measures on a non-
discriminatory basis, and straight foreign aid in much larger amounts
3. See the statement at the 93rd Plenary Meeting of the Trade & Development Board
of UNCTAD on Aug. 31, 1966. U.N. Doc. ID/B/10/Rev. 1, 9/6 (1966).
4. H. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 44.
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and on better terms. He urges that aid be extended in the form of grants
rather than loans, and he deplores conditions such as "tying" assistance
to procurement in the lending or granting country or requiring that
given proportions of goods procured with the proceeds be shipped in
bottoms of the donor nation. These are not radical prescriptions; they
represent the freer trade and aid principles which most economists, as
well as many governments, have urged, with varying degrees of success
since the Second World War.
However, Johnson is pessimistic about the prospects for enactment
of a larger program both by an increasingly recalcitrant Congress, which
is preoccupied with the war in Vietnam and the balance of payments
situation, and by other developed countries, and he thinks the chances
for lessened protectionism in the developed countries are poor. This
fear of very limited future progress along the right road, more than in-
fatuation with the merits of the alternatives, has led him to examine
seriously, as a possible "second best," proposals such as those urged
by UNCTAD concerning commodity agreements and tariff prefer-
ences. Poor though he acknowledges them to be, he thinks these mea-
sures may be better than "nothing," since they can at least result in
some resource-transfers to some less developed countries.
Johnson's own criticisms of the economic arguments for tariff pref-
erences leave little to be said; his more tender treatment of commodity
agreements leaves somewhat more. As he himself recognizes but under-
emphasizes, the current rationale for commodity agreements is vastly
different from the Havana Charter idea of securing "reasonable stabil-
ity of prices about the current long-period trend"5 in order to protect
small producers and wage-earners when normal market forces cannot
be relied upon to do so. That conception was soon modified to pro-
mote "stabilization," not solely for the benefit of producers and workers
but also to ensure regularity in the exchange earnings of the primary-
product country itself. This change was tacitly accepted in the 1950's
by consuming and producing countries alike. Now UNCTAD is
urging a second change in purpose-this one from price stabilization to
price augmentation. It wants to use commodity agreements as a form
of aid from the richer countries to secure higher levels of export earn-
ings for the poorer primary-producing countries.0 Commodity agree-
ments are envisioned as, the international counterpart of familiar
5. RowE, PPI ARY COMMODITIS IN ITEmNATIONAL TRADE 157 (1955).
6. See the note by the UNCTAD Secretariat, The Development of an International
Commodity Policy. U.N. Doc. TD/B/C/ 1/26, 10/26 (1966).
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domestic agricultural interventions such as price supports financed
through artificially higher consumer prices-which means that ulti.
mate consumers least able to pay would bear the greatest burden of
supporting international welfare measures.
The difficulties with commodity agreements thus conceived are far
too serious to expect that they will be accepted at all as a general policy,
much less as a "second best." As Rowe has pointed out, commodity
agreements on this model not only are an inefficient means of giving
aid, which they do in a haphazard manner with no relationship to real
development needs, but could well be "disastrous ... to the growth of
the world's wealth at the maximum rate. ' 7 If prices are not related to
costs of production, resources are being wasted somewhere; if the
supply of primary products is restricted below what the world should
have, the whole economic system becomes twisted and warped. The use
and adaptation of commodity control schemes to secure artificially high
prices is a throw-back to the worst controls of the inter-war period.8
Moreover, Johnson's own analysis of the difficulties of stabilizing the
prices of primary goods by means of price agreements and export
quotas indicates that this device will not even promote resource-trans-
fers except in the case of a handful of commodities where monopoly
pricing is possible and where there is little risk of substitution-e.g.,
coffee, tea, cocoa, bananas, tin. Even in that limited group, which ac.
counts'for less than 12 per cent of the total exports of the less developed
countries, there are substantial problems. Indeed, if one excludes coffee
and tin, which are already subject to commodity agreements, the figure
drops to 4 per cent, and for a number of reasons the prospects for
banana and tea agreements are dim. At least four years of efforts to
secure a cocoa agreement have not yet resulted in its conclusion.
My major quarrel with Johnson is this willingness on his part to
accept as "second best," and thus indirectly to encourage, very poor and
thinly disguised aid measures in the form of the "trade" arrangements
which UNCTAD has been publicizing for the past three years. In so
doing, he and the UNCTAD spokesmen are jeopardizing prospects for
the adoption of the very measures-greater foreign aid and less pro-
tectionism in developed countries for cotton, sugar, and other large
exchange-earners-which they both acknowledge will bring about the
substantial resource transfers to developing countries they both regard
7. RowE, supra note 5, at 215.
8. Id. 216.
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as essential. In place of such measures, they are prepared to acquiesce in
insubstantial and relatively worthless assistance.
It is a very bad bargain indeed. The worst of it is that it could suc-
ceed: some developed countries might well prefer it because it is such
a low monetary price for them to pay, because it does not require either
increased foreign aid appropriations or the sometimes painful political
and economic readjustments attendant upon a reduction of protection-
ism, and because "they" want it. But if they do so, the result can only
be deep disappointment and cynicism among the peoples of the de-
veloping countries once they realize how badly they have been misled
into thinking that their efforts to escape from misery, ignorance, and
squalor would be materially advanced by such inadequate remedies.
Such a frame of mind would augur ill for rational policies of any kind.
One need not agree with all of Johnson's conclusions or suggestions
to appreciate the excellence of his work. It is in my opinion the best
general book on the subject now available-thoughtful, well-written,
and provocative.
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